Saddam May Hang Within 24 Hours

[Maybe a Star]

Maybe they'll make Sunni wear yellow stars, half yellow/green if they are half Sunni and half Shia.

Show me your papers! You must go this way!

Sound familiar?

[mundheim]

Reports are coming in via Western based Sunni Iraqis, in their telephone calls with their families still in Bagdhad, that soldiers have been moving through the houses in Bagdhad and telling Sunni families that they have days to leave the city or they will be shot.

It seems that 'removing insurgent elements' in Bagdhad is actually translating to a complete ethnic cleansing of Bagdhad of anyone with Sunni based faith.

Of course there is no chance that these alleged “reports” from unnamed "Western based Sunni Iraqis" are false.

Of course they must be true, even if they are double hearsay from unnamed sources concerning purported conversations with other unnamed sources.

Of course they wouldn’t lie, even though they have a vested interest in what they are saying.

There are also reports coming from unnamed but reliable sources that the moon is made of green cheese.

Please.

[mundheim]

Maybe they'll make Sunni wear yellow stars, half yellow/green if they are half Sunni and half Shia.

Show me your papers! You must go this way!

Sound familiar?

Does it sound familiar to you? In what way? Were you there?

I ask because if you are referring to the Holocaust, Iran's President says the Holocaust never happened.

[one_irish_rover]

You may not be a "simpleton" in other disciplines, but you clearly have no knowledge, much less expertise, in international law -- and there is no way that you are a lawyer.

The seemingly simple questions I posed to you are in fact very complicated and the subject of hundreds of United States Supreme Court and federal appeals court decisions, volumes upon volumes of treatises and law review articles.

Consequently, I will have to proceed in two posts: (a) in this post I will provide you with a primer on International Law; and (b) in the next post, I will dissect your cut and paste job above and refute it in toto.

Let's begin the clinic :

I. What Is International Law?

International law, or the law of nations, consists of those rules and principles which govern the relations and dealings of nations and of international organizations with each other, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 101; State of New Jersey v. State of Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 54 S. Ct. 407, 78 L. Ed. 847 (1934).

The "law of nations," which is also known as "international customary law," is formed by the general assent of civilized nations. Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 993 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1998).

Norms of the "law of nations" are found by consulting juridical writing on public law, considering the general practice of nations, and referring to judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing international law. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).

International law is closely entwined with domestic laws which affect the international situation. The name given to this phase of law is "Foreign Relations Law," which consists of international law as it applies to the United States; and domestic law that has substantial significance for the foreign relations of the United States or has other substantial international consequences.

II. Who Decides What Is International Law?

A rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement derives its status as law in the United States from its character as an international legal obligation of the United States.

A rule of international law or an international agreement has no status as law of the United States if the United States is not in fact bound by it.

For example, any rule of customary law from which the United States may have dissociated itself during the process of its formation or a provision in a treaty that is invalid or has been terminated or suspended.

Thus, if states generally accept the principle that mining in the deep sea-bed is permitted only pursuant to the international regime established by the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United States will not be bound by that principle, having continued to dissent from it.

See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 111, comment b.

Cases arising under treaties to which the United States is a party, as well as cases arising under customary international law, or under international agreements of the United States other than treaties, are "Cases . . . arising under . . . the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under their Authority," and therefore within the Judicial Power of the United States under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Civil actions arising under international law or under a treaty or other international agreement of the United States are within the jurisdiction of the United States district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

For the purpose of Section 1331, all valid international agreements of the United States, whatever their designation and whatever the form by which they are concluded, are "treaties of the United States."

See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 111, comment e.

III. Treaties

Treaties, which sometimes are entitled “conventions”or “covenants,”are proper evidence of customary international law because, and insofar as, they create legal obligations akin to contractual obligations on the States parties to them. Like contracts, these instruments are legally binding only on States that become parties to them by consenting to be bound. See Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties 162 (1961) (“N]o State can be bound by any treaty provision unless it has given its assent ....”.

Under general principles of treaty law, a State's signing of a treaty serves only to “uthenticat[e]”its text; it “does not establish [the signatory's] consent to be bound.” Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 610-11 (5th ed. 1999).

A State only becomes bound by-that is, becomes a party to-a treaty when it ratifies the treaty. See id. at 611; Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 35, 19 L.Ed. 571 (1869) (observing that the United States is bound by a treaty only once “he Senate, in whom rests the authority to ratify it, ... agree[s] to it.”; Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 27 n. 3 (2d Cir.1976) (stating that the United States is not a party to an unratified treaty).

Accordingly, only States that have ratified a treaty are legally obligated to uphold the principles embodied in that treaty, and the treaty only evidences the customs and practices of those States.

In the United States, ratification occurs when “two thirds of the Senators present concur”in ratifying a signed treaty presented by the Executive. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

Thus, the United States becomes a “party” to a treaty - that is, becomes contractually bound to obey its terms - only after a treaty has been ratified by the Senate.

IV. Decisions of Multinational Tribunals

With respect to the International Court of Justice, Article 59 of the ICJ Statute expressly states that “t]he decision[s] of the Court ha[ve] no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” ICJ Statute, June 26, 1945, art. 59, 59 Stat. 1055, U.S.T.S. 993.

With respect to the European Court of Human Rights, the Court is only empowered to “interpret[ ]”and “appl[y]”the rules set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5 (“European Convention”-an instrument applicable only to its regional States parties-not to create new rules of customary international law. See European Convention art. 32 (stating that the Court's jurisdiction “extend[s] to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention”; see also ICJ Statute art. 38 (listing judicial decisions as “subsidiary,”rather than primary, sources of customary international law).

Neither the International Court of Justice, nor the European Court of Human Rights, a regional institution, is empowered to create binding norms of customary international law, and thus their decisions are not primary sources of international law; however, decisions of European Court may constitute subsidiary or secondary sources of customary international law insofar as they restate and reapply regional convention. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 406 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003), republished at, 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003).

Neither of these tribunals is empowered to create binding norms of customary international law.

V. United Nations General Assembly

The United Nations General Assembly has been described aptly as “he world's most important political discussion forum,”but it is not a law-making body. I The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 248, 269 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed.2002). UN General Assembly resolutions and declarations do not have the power to bind member States because the member States specifically denied the General Assembly that power after extensively considering the issue-first at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, held in Washington in 1944, then at the Yalta conference in 1945, and finally at the United Nations' founding conference, held in San Francisco in 1945. Id. at 269 (describing the rejection at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco of proposals to accord General Assembly resolutions the power to bind member States); cf. Stanley Meisler, United Nations: The First Fifty Years 13-14 (1995) (discussing the Yalta voting formula and the veto power in the Security Council, which alone would be empowered to issue resolutions binding on States).

The authority to make pronouncements that could be legally binding was reserved to the Security Council, in which each of the identified Great Powers of the post-war era would be permanent members and hold a veto power. See, e.g., Dolivet, The United Nations: A Handbook on the New World Organization at 45-57 (discussing the composition and function of the Security Council); Meisler, United Nations: The First Fifty Years at 14 (noting that acceptance at the Yalta Conference of the veto power in the Security Council was a sine qua non of the founding of the United Nations); Francis O. Wilcox, The Rule of Unanimity in the Security Council, 40 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 51, 52 (1946) (same, discussing the San Francisco Conference).

Under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council was afforded the power (in circumstances where no veto is exercised by a “permanent member” to issue binding resolutions, United Nations Charter, ch. VII, whereas the General Assembly was granted the power only to “make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both,”United Nations Charter, ch. IV, art. 10 (emphasis added).

In sum, as described in The Law of Nations, the classic handbook by Professors Brierly and Waldock of Oxford University:

“A]ll that the General Assembly can do is to discuss and recommend and initiate studies and consider reports from other bodies. It cannot act on behalf of all the members, as the Security Council does, and its decisions are not directions telling the member states what they are or are not to do.”

J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 110 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) (second emphasis added).

VI. Customary International Law

“Custom is the oldest and the original source of international law as well as of law in general,”the substance of which “s to be found in the practice of states.” 1 Oppenheim's International Law 25-26 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts, eds., 9th ed. 1996).

The practice of states, in turn, “embraces not only their external conduct with each other, but is also evidenced by such internal matters as their domestic legislation, judicial decisions, diplomatic dspatches, internal government memoranda, and ministerial statements in Parliaments and elsewhere.” [i]Id. at 26.

In short, customary international law is composed only of those rules that States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.

First, in order for a principle to become part of customary international law, States must universally abide by it. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888 (holding that customary international law includes only “ell-established, universally recognized norms of international law” (emphasis added); see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888); id. at 243 n. 8 (addressing whether a principle had “ripened into universally accepted norms of international law”(emphasis added)).

Of course, States need not be universally successful in implementing the principle in order for a rule of customary international law to arise. If that were the case, there would be no need for customary international law. But the principle must be more than merely professed or aspirational.

Furthermore, a principle is only incorporated into customary international law if States accede to it out of a sense of legal obligation. See, e.g., Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 307-08 (2d Cir.2000) (“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”(quoting Restatement (Third) § 102(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)).

Practices adopted for moral or political reasons, but not out of a sense of legal obligation, do not give rise to rules of customary international law. See Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243-44 (10th Cir.2002) (noting that customary international *81 law does not include those practices that States have adopted “or moral or political reasons (as opposed to any sense of legal obligation)”(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. The Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (“n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be ... carried out in such a way[ ] as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it”.

Finally, customary international law addresses only those “wrong[s]”that are “mutual, and not merely several, concern” to States. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888 (emphases added); see IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir.1975) (Friendly, J.) (defining customary international law as those “standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se”(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).FN23 Matters of “mutual”concern between States are those involving States' actions “performed ... towards or with regard to the other,”X Oxford English Dictionary 154 (2d ed.1989) - matters that, as Judge Friendly aptly noted, concern the dealings of States “inter se,”Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015. Matters of “several”concern among States are matters in which States are separately and independently interested. See XV Oxford English Dictionary 97 (2d ed.1989) (defining “several”as having “ position, existence, or status apart[,] separate, [or] distinct”from one another).

In sum, those clear and unambiguous rules by which States universally abide, or to which they accede, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern, constitute the body of customary international law. But where the customs and practices of States demonstrate that they do not universally follow a particular practice out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern, that practice cannot give rise to a rule of customary international law.

And no -- I didn't copy the above fromone place.

Do you get the sense that you may be in above your head, N?


(To Be Continued with Part II, The Dissection and Refutation)

I don't have time to read all that babble, I just skimmed through it, and I pretty much knew the major points already. Much of it was implicit in the post and questions I offered. It's common knowledge to anyone who keeps up with current events, but thank you for the superfluous tutorial. No, I don't feel like I'm in over my head at all, to answer your question concisely. All you did is recite tedious definitions which anyone of any age could look up. How about applying your dazzling knowledge and intellect in a creative and insightful way to the actual points I made. You can impress me that way if that's your goal. And why do you know my first initial? Are you stalking me?

OIR

Apparently, you missed the following:

Under general principles of treaty law, a State's signing of a treaty serves only to “uthenticat[e]”its text; it “does not establish [the signatory's] consent to be bound.” Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 610-11 (5th ed. 1999).

Accordingly, only States that have ratified a treaty are legally obligated to uphold the principles embodied in that treaty, and the treaty only evidences the customs and practices of those States.

In the United States, ratification occurs when “two thirds of the Senators present concur”in ratifying a signed treaty presented by the Executive. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

Thus, the United States becomes a “party” to a treaty - that is, becomes contractually bound to obey its terms - only after a treaty has been ratified by the Senate.

I should add that countries routinely sign and ratify treaties with "reservations" -- not just the United States, and not just the United States under Bush.

Moreover, bilateral and multilateral treaties often have abrogation clauses that permit any party to the treaty to withdraw from the treaty without violating its provisions.

Can you point to a single instance from your cut and paste list in which the Bush Administration was adjudged to have violated a treaty ratified by the United States Senate, by a competent (that's a term of art meaning "valid," among other things) tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the United States as a party?

Can you point to a single instance from your cut and paste list in which the Bush Administration was found to have violated international law by a competent tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the United States as a party?

Only then can you say "The Bush White House openly rejects international law . . ."

I pasted a list of reference facts. The analysis is my own. Much of what is on the list occured during Bush's presidency. I stated at the outset of the list that "On many occasions Bush and the Republican congress have framed their own laws in violation to those they've already signed onto."

1. The difference between signing and ratification is a valid point.

2. The US has a history of unilateralism, yes, including under Clinton and many presidents before him, Democratic and Republican. I'm not denying that, only saying that Bush is exemplary in this regard. The list provides a context in which to view the Bush administrations disregard and disdain for multilateralism.

Since I can't get you to answer a question directly, which is typical of politicians and lawyers, I will take a step backward and ask two simpler questions:

Has the US signed and ratified the Geneva Conventions?

Is the US, as a member of the UN, bound by the UN Charter and all articles therein?

Now be a good teacher, or student, whichever role you prefer and type me something nice (and succinct).

[mundheim]

There are four "Geneva Conventions" (1864, 1906, 1929, 1949) and three Additional Protocols (1977, 1977, 2005).

The United States is a party to the four Geneva Conventions, with Reservations and Declarations. See http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/D6B53F5B5D14F35AC1256402003F9920?OpenDocument ; http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView

The United States has not ratified any of the Additional Protocols.

The United States is a party to the United Nations Charter and a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council with veto power.

[Guest]

2. The US has a history of unilateralism, yes, including under Clinton and many presidents before him, Democratic and Republican. I'm not denying that, only saying that Bush is exemplary in this regard. The list provides a context in which to view the Bush administrations disregard and disdain for multilateralism.

Most Presidents haven't dealt with an attack on their own soil, exemplary or otherwise.

[mundheim]

2. The US has a history of unilateralism, yes, including under Clinton and many presidents before him, Democratic and Republican. I'm not denying that, only saying that Bush is exemplary in this regard. The list provides a context in which to view the Bush administrations disregard and disdain for multilateralism.

Most Presidents haven't dealt with an attack on their own soil, exemplary or otherwise.

No modern President has dealt with an attack on the American mainland, much less a dual attack on the financial capital, New York City, and on the political capital, Washington, D.C. -- specifically on the Pentagon itself.

[Guest]

The top 20 killers of the 20th century.

In a class by themselves:
1) Mao
2) Hitler
3) Stalin

The rest of the multi-million-butchers:
4) Chiang Kai-shek (China: 1928-49)
5) Enver Pasha (Turkey: 1913-18)
6) Hirohito (Japan: 1926-89)
7) Hirota Koki (Japan: 1936-37)
Ho Chi Minh (North Vietnam: 1945-69)
9) Kim Il Sung (North Korea: 1948-94)
10) Lenin (USSR: 1917-24)
11) Leopold II (Belgium: 1865-1909)
12) Nicholas II (Russia: 1894-1917)
13) Pol Pot (Cambodia: 1975-79)
14) Saddam Hussein (Iraq: 1969-2006)
15) Tojo Hideki (Japan: 1941-44)
16) Wilhelm II (Germany: 1888-1918)
17) Yahya Khan (Pakistan: 1969-71)
18) Idi Amin (Uganda: 1971-80)
19) Ion Antonescu (Romania: 1940-44)
20) Ataturk (Turkey: 1920-38)

May they rest in hell. The last of these vicious nasty works, number 14, was executed in 2006.

[Guest]

14) Saddam Hussein (Iraq: 1969-2003) Executed 2007.

Sorry for the typo(s).

[mundheim]

I like the list -- each and every name worthy of top billing as an evil mass murderer.

[Guest]

British believe Bush is more dangerous than Kim Jong-il
Julian Glover
Friday November 3, 2006
The Guardian

The ICM poll ranks the US president with some of his bitterest enemies as a cause of global anxiety.

America is now seen as a threat to world peace by its closest neighbours and allies, according to an international survey of public opinion published today that reveals just how far the country's reputation has fallen among former supporters since the invasion of Iraq.

Carried out as US voters prepare to go to the polls next week in an election dominated by the war, the research also shows that British voters see George Bush as a greater danger to world peace than either the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, or the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Both countries were once cited by the US president as part of an "axis of evil", but it is Mr Bush who now alarms voters in countries with traditionally strong links to the US.

The survey has been carried out by the Guardian in Britain and leading newspapers in Israel (Haaretz), Canada (La Presse and Toronto Star) and Mexico (Reforma), using professional local opinion polling in each country.

It exposes high levels of distrust. In Britain, 69% of those questioned say they believe US policy has made the world less safe since 2001, with only 7% thinking action in Iraq and Afghanistan has increased global security.

The finding is mirrored in America's immediate northern and southern neighbours, Canada and Mexico, with 62% of Canadians and 57% of Mexicans saying the world has become more dangerous because of US policy.

Even in Israel, which has long looked to America to guarantee national security, support for the US has slipped.

Only one in four Israeli voters say that Mr Bush has made the world safer, outweighed by the number who think he has added to the risk of international conflict, 36% to 25%. A further 30% say that at best he has made no difference.

Voters in three of the four countries surveyed also overwhelmingly reject the decision to invade Iraq, with only Israeli voters in favour, 59% to 34% against. Opinion against the war has hardened strongly since a similar survey before the US presidential election in 2004.

In Britain 71% of voters now say the invasion was unjustified, a view shared by 89% of Mexicans and 73% of Canadians. Canada is a Nato member whose troops are in action in Afghanistan. Neither do voters think America has helped advance democracy in developing countries, one of the justifications for deposing Saddam Hussein. Only 11% of Britons and 28% of Israelis think that has happened.

As a result, Mr Bush is ranked with some of his bitterest enemies as a cause of global anxiety. He is outranked by Osama bin Laden in all four countries, but runs the al-Qaida leader close in the eyes of UK voters: 87% think the al-Qaida leader is a great or moderate danger to peace, compared with 75% who think this of Mr Bush.

The US leader and close ally of Tony Blair is seen in Britain as a more dangerous man than the president of Iran (62% think he is a danger), the North Korean leader (69%) and the leader of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah (65%).

Only 10% of British voters think that Mr Bush poses no danger at all. Israeli voters remain much more trusting of him, with 23% thinking he represents a serious danger and 61% thinking he does not.

Contrary to the usual expectation, older voters in Britain are slightly more hostile to the Iraq war than younger ones. Voters under 35 are also more trusting of Mr Bush, with hostility strongest among people aged 35-65.

· ICM interviewed a random sample of 1,010 adults by telephone from October 27-30. Interviews were conducted across the country and the results have been weighted to the profile of all adults. Polling was by phone in Canada (sample 1,007), Israel (1,078) and Mexico (1,010)

[Guest]

British believe Bush is more dangerous than Kim Jong-il
Julian Glover
Friday November 3, 2006
The Guardian

The ICM poll ranks the US president with some of his bitterest enemies as a cause of global anxiety.

America is now seen as a threat to world peace by its closest neighbours and allies, according to an international survey of public opinion published today that reveals just how far the country's reputation has fallen among former supporters since the invasion of Iraq.

Carried out as US voters prepare to go to the polls next week in an election dominated by the war, the research also shows that British voters see George Bush as a greater danger to world peace than either the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, or the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Both countries were once cited by the US president as part of an "axis of evil", but it is Mr Bush who now alarms voters in countries with traditionally strong links to the US.

The survey has been carried out by the Guardian in Britain and leading newspapers in Israel (Haaretz), Canada (La Presse and Toronto Star) and Mexico (Reforma), using professional local opinion polling in each country.

It exposes high levels of distrust. In Britain, 69% of those questioned say they believe US policy has made the world less safe since 2001, with only 7% thinking action in Iraq and Afghanistan has increased global security.

The finding is mirrored in America's immediate northern and southern neighbours, Canada and Mexico, with 62% of Canadians and 57% of Mexicans saying the world has become more dangerous because of US policy.

Even in Israel, which has long looked to America to guarantee national security, support for the US has slipped.

Only one in four Israeli voters say that Mr Bush has made the world safer, outweighed by the number who think he has added to the risk of international conflict, 36% to 25%. A further 30% say that at best he has made no difference.

Voters in three of the four countries surveyed also overwhelmingly reject the decision to invade Iraq, with only Israeli voters in favour, 59% to 34% against. Opinion against the war has hardened strongly since a similar survey before the US presidential election in 2004.

In Britain 71% of voters now say the invasion was unjustified, a view shared by 89% of Mexicans and 73% of Canadians. Canada is a Nato member whose troops are in action in Afghanistan. Neither do voters think America has helped advance democracy in developing countries, one of the justifications for deposing Saddam Hussein. Only 11% of Britons and 28% of Israelis think that has happened.

As a result, Mr Bush is ranked with some of his bitterest enemies as a cause of global anxiety. He is outranked by Osama bin Laden in all four countries, but runs the al-Qaida leader close in the eyes of UK voters: 87% think the al-Qaida leader is a great or moderate danger to peace, compared with 75% who think this of Mr Bush.

The US leader and close ally of Tony Blair is seen in Britain as a more dangerous man than the president of Iran (62% think he is a danger), the North Korean leader (69%) and the leader of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah (65%).

Only 10% of British voters think that Mr Bush poses no danger at all. Israeli voters remain much more trusting of him, with 23% thinking he represents a serious danger and 61% thinking he does not.

Contrary to the usual expectation, older voters in Britain are slightly more hostile to the Iraq war than younger ones. Voters under 35 are also more trusting of Mr Bush, with hostility strongest among people aged 35-65.

· ICM interviewed a random sample of 1,010 adults by telephone from October 27-30. Interviews were conducted across the country and the results have been weighted to the profile of all adults. Polling was by phone in Canada (sample 1,007), Israel (1,078) and Mexico (1,010)

There's a fool born every minute.

[Guest]

There's a fool born every minute.

As everyone is upset with the USA and it's plans to put a base in Iraq, the USA should withdraw. I also think it's time to take back the bases in S.Korea and Japan, Eurpoe and the rest of the world.

We just need to wait around 10 years and start trading with super China (owner of Tiawan, Japan and western Russia) and super Korea, owner of S. Korea, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand) and Russia, owner of western Europe and Turkey) Once the initial few hundred million people are dead, the world should stabilize. I say bully.

[mundheim]

There's a fool born every minute.

As everyone is upset with the USA and it's plans to put a base in Iraq, the USA should withdraw. I also think it's time to take back the bases in S.Korea and Japan, Eurpoe and the rest of the world.

We just need to wait around 10 years and start trading with super China (owner of Tiawan, Japan and western Russia) and super Korea, owner of S. Korea, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand) and Russia, owner of western Europe and Turkey) Once the initial few hundred million people are dead, the world should stabilize. I say bully.

I have no problem in principle with an isolationist United States, but I don't agree that Taiwan, Japan and Australia should be abandoned.

The Taiwanese have shown great courage in standing up to the Red Chinese, and the U.S. can't afford to give the Chinese "a freebee" on Taiwan's advanced computer technology.

The Japanese have been solid allies after World War II, and the U.S. can't afford to give the Chinese "a freebee" on Japan's advanced computer technology and manufacturing knowhow in heavy industries (e.g., ships, heavy equipment).

The Aussies have probably been America's staunchest allies through thick and thin. You don't just abandon solid friends like that.

Everyone else can fend for themselves.

[Nefarious]

Well now I think this is all a bit over the top. All the world could ask for is that USA is an equal member of the UN that doesn't break with the UN whenever it suits its own purposes. Less of the 'we're top of the heap - we'll do whatever we want' and more respect to the rest of the world as a part of the international community.